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To the true college sports fan, March can be the most exciting month in college athletics.
Popularly known as "March Madness," this is the time to take pride in our hometown
school or alma mater. However, as we sit back with ourfriends andfamily to enjoy the
games and fill out our brackets, we should not lose sight of the fact that any particular
game could be fixed. And while we may never know if that missed shot at the buzzer
was intentional, to think that it couldn't happen would be bothfoolish and naive.
J.D., May 2002, University of Miami School of Law, BA 1999, University of Maryland at
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, federal legislation known as the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act1 (PASPA) was signed into law. PASPA prohibits the
expansion of state-sanctioned, authorized or licensed gambling on amateur
and professional sporting events in the United States. 2 However, PASPA
exempted several states that already conducted, or were contemplating, some
form of amateur or professional sports gambling within their respective
jurisdiction.3 Now, after almost ten years, and several highly publicized
point shaving scandals in our nation's universities, Congress is reconsidering
its decision to exempt certain states from PASPA's reach.
I. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE SPORTS GAMBLING
Throughout our nation's history, the federal government has largely
deferred to the States in gambling matters. However, in the early 1950's,
congressional investigations into the activities of organized crime in the
gambling industry resulted in an enhanced federal role. The federal
government's role was further enhanced during the 1960's through a series
of measures aimed at fighting organized crime. In the early 1970's, Congress
took another step in its effort to combat organized crime by enacting the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes.4
Finally, in 1992 legislation aimed specifically at sports wagering, PASPA, was
enacted.
In assessing Congress's power to regulate sports gambling, I have placed
the various regulatory measures into three distinct time periods. I will first
discuss the federal legislation prior to the enactment of PASPA in 1992.
Secondly, I will fully explore PASPA, its constitutionality, and the various
attacks on it. Lastly, I will describe the current legislation in Congress, which
seeks to expand the reach of PASPA by providing a blanket prohibition on
collegiate sports gambling.
28 U.S.C. SS 3701-04 (2000).
2 28 U.S.C. S 3702 (2000).
3 28 U.S.C. S 3704 (2000).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 18, 19.
LAS VEGAS LOOPHOLE
A. Federal Legislation Prior to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act
In the early 1950's, Congress enhanced the federal government's role in
investigating the activities of organized crime in the gambling industry. This
was done through the creation of the Special Rackets Squad of the FBI and
the enactment of the Gaming Devices Act of 1951 (commonly referred to as
the Johnson Act)? The Johnson Act gave the federal government -
specifically the FBI - its first real jurisdiction over illegal gambling by making
it a crime to transport gambling devices across state lines to locations not
specifically exempted by local or state law.6
The federal government expanded its regulatory role over organized
crime, and the gambling activity associated with it, through the 1961 Wire
Communications Act ("Wire Act").7 The Wire Act prohibits the use of wire
communications (telephones, telegrams, etc.), by persons or organizations
engaged in the business of wagering, to transmit bets or wagers, or
information that assists in the placing of bets or wagers." In drafting the Wire
Act, Congress took precise care to include the language "on any sporting
event or contest" when expanding on the phrase "the placing of bets or
wagers."9 As illustrated in Martin v. United States, o the Wire Act was "part of
an omnibus crime bill that recognized the need for independent federal
action to combat interstate gambling operations."1
In addition to the Wire Act, a complimentary enactment known as the
Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering
5 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (2000).
6 TheJohnson Act was later amended to exempt cruise ships (but not airlines) either originating
from or bound for the United States.
7 18 U.S.C. S 1084 (2000).
8 18 U.S.C. S 1084(a) (2000).
9 Id.
to Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1968).
I ld. at 898. See also, United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the legislative history of the Wire Act sets forth a dual purpose - to assist the various states
in enforcing their gambling laws and to aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities). The
purpose of the bill has also been described as follows:
To assist the various States, territories, and possessions of the United States and the District
of Columbia in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like
offenses and to aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use
ofor the leasing, furnishing, or maintainingofwire communication facilities which are or will
be used for the transmission of bets or wagers and gambling information in interstate or
foreign commerce.
Martin, 389 F.2d 898 n.6.
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Enterprises Act ("Travel Act") prohibits travel or use of the mail, either
interstate or internationally, to carry on "any unlawful activity.", 2 In defining
the phrase "any unlawful activity," the Travel Act provides as an example
"any business enterprise involving gambling."13
Adding to these measures are other federal laws such as the prohibition
on the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia ("ITWP")14 and the
interstate transportation of gambling machines.' s In addition to the foregoing
series of statutes, federal law also criminalizes conspiracy to commit sports
bribery 6 and conspiracy to obstruct law enforcement in order to facilitate
illegal gambling.
1 7
Lastly, the RICO statutes were enacted in 1971 under the Crime Control
Act in an effort to combat "the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate
commerce." 8 A look at the legislative history behind RICO reveals the
obvious conclusion that sports gambling was one of the primary operations
that Congress sought to contain. 9
When considering the constitutionality of these federal anti-gambling
measures, federal courts have continuously rejected defendants' claims.
Illustrative of this trend is United States v. Cappetto,2" in which the Seventh
Circuit held that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which made it
a federal offense to participate in a gambling business, is authorized by the
Commerce Clause. 1 Similarly, in United States v. Smaldone,22 the Tenth
Circuit held that Congress acted within its power under the Commerce
Clause when it enacted a federal statute that prohibited bookmaking on
12 18 U.S.C. S 1952 (2000).
13 Id.
14 18 U.S.C. S 1953 (2000).
is 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (2000).
16 18 U.S.C. S 224 (2000).
17 18 U.S.C. S 1511 (2000).
is Senate Report No. 91-617,91st Congress, 1st Session 80 (1969).
19 Id.
20 United States v. Cappettq 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
21 Id. at 1356 (further stating that defendants' argument that Congress lacks authority to prohibit
gambling "need not detain us long").
United States v. Smaldonc, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974),
reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974). See also, United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972) (providing that appellants' assertion that federal gambling statute "infringes
upon the rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment ... cannot be maintained with either
conviction or plausibility"); Nilva v. United States, 212 F.2d 115, 119 (8th Cir. 1954),cert. denied, 348 U.S.
825 (1954), rehg denied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954) (holding that Congress is not required to enact laws which
are uniform in application when exercising Commerce Clause power).
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sporting events. Furthermore, the court held that the statute did not violate
the equal protection clause through its "unequal geographic enforcement."'
B. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
In 1992, PASPA was signed into law by President George Herbert
Walker Bush to ensure the integrity of athletic competitions- by prohibiting
gambling on most sporting events.2 Because sports gambling has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress has the authority to
legislate in this area under its Federal Commerce Clause power.26 However,
in acknowledging that sports gambling was presently legal in Nevada,
Oregon, and Delaware and that elimination of such schemes in these
particular states would work a harsh result, Congress exempted certain states
from PASPA's proscription."
2 Smnaldone, 485 F.2d at 1343.
24 At the time of its passage, Sen. Bill Bradley (D-NJ) said:
Based on what I know about the dangers of sports betting, I am not prepared to risk the values
that sports install in youth just to add a few more dollars to state coffers.... State-sanctioned
sports betting conveys the message that sports are more about money than personal
achievement and sportsmanship. In these days of scandal and disillusionment, it is important
that our youngsters not receive this message... sports betting threatens the integrity of and
public confidence in professional and amateur team sports, converting sports from wholesome
athletic entertainment into a vehicle for gambling . . . sports gambling raises people's
suspicions about point-shaving and game-fixing .... All of this puts undue pressure on
players, coaches, and officials.
National Gambling Impact Study Commission,June 18, 1999 at 3-8,9 (hereinafterNGISC).
5 28 U.S.C. § 3701-3704. Section 3702 of the Act stipulates the following:
It shall be unlawful for (1) a government entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license,
or authorize by law or compact, or (2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote,
pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of
geographic references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or
professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances
of such athletes in such games.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8. This article provides: "the Congress shall have Power... [to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...."
77 Section 3704 of PASPA states that S 3702 shall not apply to:
(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a
State or other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State
or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and
ending August 31, 1990; (2) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity where both - (a) such scheme was
authorized by a statute as in effect on October 2, 1991; and (b) a scheme described in Section
3702 (other than one based on parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games) actually conducted
in that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning September
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Despite its popularity, and contrary to popular belief, sports wagering in
America is illegal today in all but two states. Nevada offers sports wagering
through its 153 licensed sports books2' and Oregon runs a state lottery game,
called "Sports Action," based on games played in the National Football
League.29 Delaware and Montana are also permitted to have sports books by
statute,30 but neither state currently offers legalized sports wagering. As a
result, outside of Nevada and Oregon, wagering on sports is illegal in the
United States. Further, Nevada is the only state where gambling on
collegiate sporting events is currently legal.
C. Current Legislation Seeking to Modify the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act
Pending legislation before the U.S. House of Representative23' and
Senate32 is seeking to resolve any ambiguity associated with betting on
collegiate sporting events by removing the exemption in PASPA, thus
making it clearly illegal to gamble on college sports in every state.
Proponents of this legislation believe that sports gambling is already a
recognized federal issue with federal jurisdiction. In short, the desired
impact of this legislation is to close what has now become known as the Las
Vegas Loophole.
It is urged by many that Congress should carefully consider the
important constitutional issues raised by the Student Athlete Protection Act,
the Amateur Sports Integrity Act, and the High School and College Sports
Gambling Prohibition Act. When considering Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, in the years since NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,33 Congress
has had a considerably greater latitude in regulating conduct and transactions
1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the law of that State or other governmental
entity; (3) a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme, other than a lottery described in paragraph
(1), conducted exclusively in casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent that - (a)
such scheme or a similar scheme was authorized, not later than one year after the effective date
of this chapter, to be operated in that municipality; and (b) any commercial casino gaming
scheme was in operation in such municipality throughout the ten-year period ending on such
effective date pursuant to a comprehensive system of State regulation authorized by that State's
constitution and applicable solely to such municipality; or (4) parimutuel animal racing orjai-
alai games.
Data provided by the Nevada Gaming Control Board, Tax and License Division.
NGISC, supra note 24, at 2-14.
30 28 U.S.C. S 3704 (2000).
31 H.R. 3575,106th Cong. (2000) (known as the Student Athlete Protection Act).
32 S. 2021, 106th Cong. (2000) (known as the High School and College Sports Gambling
Prohibition Act), S. 2340, 106th Cong (2000) (known as the Amateur Sports Integrity Act).
33 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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than previous case law permitted. However, in a series of cases starting with
U.S. v. Lopez, 4 through the recent decision of U.S. v. Morrison,3' the
Supreme Court has held statutes unconstitutional for intruding on areas of
traditional state control, despite worthy objectives and claims that Congress
was acting within its Commerce Clause authority.
Lopez emphasized, that even under our modern, expansive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, Congress's regulatory authority is not without
effective bounds.36 Moreover, Lopez observed that modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has "identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power."37 "First, Congress may
regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce."3" "Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."39  "Finally,
Congress's Commerce Clause authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
"4
Applying this framework, the Lopez Court held that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,"' which made it a federal crime to knowingly
possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause.42 Not only did the statute have nothing to do with
commerce, it contained "no expressjurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.'
Building upon this framework, Morrison similarly held that the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994" was not, in any sense of the phrase, an
economic activity.45 Further, "the regulation and punishment of intrastate
34 U.S. v. Lope, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
35 U.S. v. Morrisor, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
36 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
37 Id. at 558 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
276-77 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
38 Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
39 Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222
U.S. 20 (1911); Perez, 402 U.S. at 150).
4 Id. at 558-59 (citingJones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37).
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1991).
42 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
43 Id. at 562.
44 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995).
45 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity").
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violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States." 6 Simply stated, Congress lacked authority under its Commerce
Clause power to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
PASPA, on the other hand, along with the currently proposed legislation
in Congress which would close its loophole, are both distinguishable from
cases like Lopez and Morrison in that legislation dealing with collegiate sports
gambling clearly affects interstate commerce. Not only are NCAA games
played across the country, but gamblers also cross state lines to bet on or
watch these games. As a result, Congress has an interest in ensuring the
uniformity of law throughout the nation.
Further, while the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated that collegiate
gambling is within the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, it has upheld statutes ofa similar nature. For example, in the seminal
case of Champion v. Ames,47 the Court held that the prohibition against
carrying lottery tickets across state lines was subject to Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce.48 Champion was indicted for shipping a box
of Paraguayan lottery tickets from Texas to California, in violation of the
Federal Lottery Act of 1895.49 The relevance of Champion lies in the Court's
discussion of Congress' ability to legislate against "an evil ... carried on
through interstate commerce. "50 Furthermore, the Champion opinion should
be read to support the proposition that Congress may regulate sports
wagering on the basis that it deems such activity to be a "moral and social
wrong" affecting interstate commerce.51
Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. United States,
52
holding that the purely intrastate activity of loan sharking affects interstate
commerce and is within the Federal Commerce Clause power, is analogous
to the current legislation dealing with collegiate sports gambling. In both
Pere-' and PASPA (including its proposed modifications) there has been
46 Id. at 1754.
47 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
48 Id. at 345.
49 Id. at 323.
50 Id. at 337. See also, Sen. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act - Polity
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALLJ. SPORTs L. 5 (1992). Senator Bradley argues that the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act's prohibition against state-sponsored sports lotteries is
similar to the statutory prohibition in Champion in that in each case Congress has devised a means to
protect the country at large from "a species of interstate commerce which, although in general use and
somewhat favored in both national and state legislation ... has grown into disrepute and has become
offensive to the entire pool of the Nation."
S1 Bradley, supra note 50, at 14.
52 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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ample evidence presented to Congress to support its findings that the
regulated activity has a direct impact on interstate affairs s3 In Perez, the
defendant was convicted of loan sharking in violation of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. 4 Relyingon congressional findings that loan sharking
directly affected interstate commerce, 55 the majority noted that even where
such transactions are local in character, they have a direct impact on
commerce between the states.5 6 As a result, the Court found that the exercise
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause was justified in this
instance.
Lastly, support for the proposition that the proposed federal legislation
is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power lies in the fact that
Congress has enacted numerous federal statutes that contain a variety of
gambling prohibitions.5" All ofthese statutes have withstood judicial scrutiny
and have been held to be a proper exercise of Congress's power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause.
mI. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION MODIFYING THE PROFESSIONAL
AND SPORTS PROTECTION ACT
PASPA's exemption has not worked for college athletics and is
jeopardizing the integrity of collegiate sporting events. Over the last five
5 Id. at 155-57.
54 Id. at 146, 149-54.
I Id. at 155-57. In reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed out that the findings of Congress
indicate that "there is a tie-in between local loan sharks and interstate crime." Id. at 155. Furthermore,
the Court relied on a report submitted to the House which revealed that "organized crime takes over $350
million a year from America's poor through loan sharking." Id. (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24460-64 (Aug.
29, 1967)).
% Id. at 156-57. In emphasizing its reliance on the Congressional findings, the Court indicated
that "loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized crime holds its guns to the heads of the
poor and rich alike.., to finance its national operations." Id. at 157. A similar argument can be made
regarding the way organized crime utilizes collegiate sports gambling to launder money from illegal sports
gambling operations through legitimate sports books. It then uses this newly laundered money to finance
other illegal operations. Steve DuCharme, Chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, is quoted
in a February 1999 Sports Business Journal article as saying "We've taken steps to crack down on the
amount of illegal money being laundered through legitimate sports books. We really have no way of
knowing [how much is laundered through the legal sports books]. Based on transcriptions of wiretaps,
it is millions of dollars."
57 Id. at 154-55.
58 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000) (proscribing the conducting of"illegal gambling business");
18 U.S.C. S 1953 (2000) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia); 18 U.S.C.
S 1511 (2000) (rendering unlawful the conspiracy to obstruct law enforcement in order to facilitate illegal
gambling); and 18 U.S.C. S 1084 (2000) (prohibiting the use of wire communication to transmit sports
wagering information).
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years, basketball players at Northwestern and Arizona State universities were
indicted on charges of point-shaving. Only three years before that, football
players at Boston College and the University of Maryland were suspended
for gambling on college games, with at least four admitting to placing bets on
their own games. Overall, "[t]he 1990's saw more college sports gambling-
related scandals on college campuses than the previous five decades
combined." 9
In addition to ruining the integrity of various collegiate sporting events,
the profits from illegal sports wagering help finance other activities of
organized crime. Money skimmed from sports wagering is used to fund
drug sales, loan-sharking, and other illegal activities that a casual bettor does
not acknowledge. 6° In the end, our college athletes and the sporting events
are the ultimate victims.
A. The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Recommends that
PASPA's Exemption be Eliminated
In June 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
(NGISC), comprised of bipartisan members appointed in 1996 by the
president and the leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S.
Senate, issued their recommendations to Congress. 6' Among the
recommendations of the NGISC was that "betting on collegiate and amateur
athletic events that is currently legal be banned altogether." 62
The NGISC heard testimony that collegiate sports wagering is a serious
problem that has devastated families and careers.63 It also learned that sports
wagering threatens the integrity of sports, puts student athletes in a
vulnerable position, and can put adolescent gamblers at risk for future
gambling problems.'
Further, there is considerable evidence that sports wagering is widespread
on America's college campuses. According to Cedric Dempsey, executive
director of the NCAA, "[tihere is evidence more money is spent on
gambling on campuses than on alcohol.6' Dempsey goes on to say that
"[e]very campus has student bookies. We are also seeing an increase in the
59 Lou Holtz,All Bets are off Thne to Stop Gambling on College Athletics, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2000, at A15.
60 William S. Saum, Sports Gambling in College: Cracking Down on Illegal Betting, USA TODAY-
MAGAZINE, July 1, 1999, at 62.
61 See NGISC, supra note 24.
6. Id. at 3-18.
63 Id. at 2-14.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2-15.
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involvement of organized crime on sports wagering." 66  For example,
gambling rings have been uncovered at Michigan State University,
University of Maine, University of Rhode Island, Bryant College,
Northwestern, and Boston College, among many other institutions.
67
The NGISC went on to state that "[m]any Americans do not know that
the majority of sports wagering in America is illegal. In addition, many do
not know about the risks and impacts of sports wagering and about the
possible legal consequences."' Even when Americans understand the
illegality of sports wagering, it is easy to participate in, widely accepted,
extremely popular, and, at present, not likely to be prosecuted.69 Finally,
because sports wagering is illegal in most states, it does not provide many of
the positive impacts that other forms of gambling provide. Specifically,
sports gambling does not contribute to local economies or produce many
jobs.7" And unlike casinos or other destination resorts, sports wagering does
not create other economic sectors.7'
The importance of regulating legal sports wagering and stifling illegal
sports wagering has been acknowledged by both professional and amateur
sports organizations, which have strict regulations regarding sports
wagering.72 Currently, NCAA initiatives recognize the importance of raising
awareness of the problems associated with sports wagering and problem and
pathological gambling. Television broadcast has proven to be a powerful tool
for educating the public about the problems associated with sports wagering.
For example, the NCAA contracts with CBS and ESPN to run public service
announcements (PSA's) during the broadcast of popular sporting events,
such as the Division I men's basketball tournament. 73 In 1998, CBS, in
conjunction with the NCAA, developed a lengthy segment on sports
wagering that aired between the Division I men's basketball semifinal games.
These announcements are only a part of the larger gambling education
programs that the NCAA plans to develop. 4
66 Id. (citing Gary Lundy, NCAA Says Lady Vols Not Safe from Gamnblers, KNOXVILLE NEWS-
SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 1998, at Cl).
67 Id. (citing Tim Layden, Betor Education, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 3, 1995, at 68).
68 NGISC, supra note 24, at 3-10.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
r Id. at 3-11. For example, the National Football League, Major League Baseball, and the
National Basketball Association have all issued rules declaring that betting on your own sport is grounds
for dismissal for any athlete or coach. Each league also offers referral services for treatment of problem
or pathological gambling and other addictions.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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B. The University of Michigan Surveys
Another argument for an increase in regulation on collegiate sports
gambling is that athletes themselves are often tempted to bet on contests in
which they participate, thus undermining the integrity of the game.
According to the findings of a recent University of Michigan survey on
collegiate sports gambling, 35% of all athletes and more than 45% of male
collegiate football and basketball athletes admit to betting on sporting events,
despite current NCAA regulations7s that prohibit such activities. 76 Further,
more than 5% of male student-athletes provided inside information for
gambling purposes, bet on games in which they were participating, or
accepted money for performing poorly in a game - otherwise known as
"shaving points."'
A second survey conducted at the University of Michigan documents
that 40% of Division I sports officials bet on sports, and that twelve of the
respondents in the survey indicated "they were aware of other officials who
did not call games fairly because of gambling reasons."78 While gambling
among Division I sports officials is not the central focus of this comment, the
presence of such activity provides additional support for considering the
legislative modifications of PASPA.
C. The University of Cincinnati Survey
The findings from the initial University of Michigan Study provided
support for a similar study conducted by two University of Cincinnati
criminal justice professors and commissioned by the NCAA. Frank Cullen
75 1997-98 NCAA Division I Manual, Rule 10.3, at 51 states that a college athlete cannot provide
any information about games to any gamblers, solicit a bet on any intercollegiate team, accept a bet on any
team representing the institution, or participate in any gambling activity that involves intercollegiate
athletics or professional athletics, through a bookmaker, parlay card, or any other method employed by
organized gambling. Rule 10.3 reflects a 1996 amendment which included professional sports betting to
the prohibition. In addition, Rule 10.4, at 52-3 provides for the discipline of prospective or enrolled
student-athletes violating the above mentioned Rule 10.3. Specifically, they can be declared ineligible for
further competition, subject to appeal to the NCAA Eligibility Committee for restoration of eligibility.
However, according to the NCAA's Internet database of serondary infractions, only about two-dozen
enforcement actions were taken in the three years from 1996-1998 with respect to violations of NCAA
Rule 10.3.
76 MICHAEL E. CROSS AND ANN G. VOLLANO, THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF GAMBLING
AMONG COLLEGE STUDENT ATHLETES (University of Michigan Athletic Department) (1999).
77 Id.
78 ANN G. VOLLANO AND DERRICK L. GRAGG, NCAA DIVISION I OFFICIALS: GAMBLING WITH
THE INTEGRITY OF SPORTS (University of Michigan Athletic Department) (2000).
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and Edward Latessa surveyed 2000 NCAA Division I basketball and football
players and received 648 responses. Their findings provide that almost 4%
of student-athletes said that they had gambled on a game in which they had
played; almost 26% said that they had gambled on other collegiate sporting
events; and three of the athletes said they had received money from gamblers
not to perform well in one of their own games.
79
D. Recent Point-Shaving Scandals
While point-shaving scandals have pre-dated' the emergence of modern
sports books in Nevada, the frequency1 of these scandals has been increasing
at an alarming rate. While a full exploration of all point-shaving scandals is
beyond the scope of this comment, a look at three universities involved in
recent point-shaving scandals seems to comprehensively represent the larger
problem.
1. BOSTON COLLEGE UNIVERSITY
One of the schools that has been hit the hardest by sports wagering
scandals is Boston College University. In its first incident, Rick Kuhn, a
former center for the Boston College basketball team, was convicted of
taking money from the mob to shave points in five games during the 1978-79
basketball season.82 Kuhn's involvement in the Boston College point-
shaving scandal is described in detail in United States v. Burke.
3
See Tom Weir, Groups Team Up to Help Protect Games, Athletes, USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 1997, at
IC; Saum, supra note 60; Greg Couch, NCAA Bets on Reonns: Colleges Try to Catch Up With Epidemic of
Athletes Placing Wagers on Sports, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at 87; David Goodman, Survey
Spotlights College Gambling: Study Finds 45% of Male Athletes Bet on Sports, Some on Oivn Games, DALLAS
MORNING NEwS,Jan. 12, 1999, at 1A.
80 Patrick Hruby, The Fix: Will a Proposed Federal Ban on College Sports Gambling be Enough to Stymie
Scandal?, THE WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8,2000, at Al (noting that a college sports betting ban would act like
a tourniquet on a severed limb: better than nothing, but hardly enough). Consider this: In a single three-
year span, eighty-six college games were fixed in seventeen states by thirty-two players from seven schools.
The period in question was 1947-50 - decades before the modern sports books emerged in Nevada. Id.
81 The 1990's saw more college sports gambling-related scandals on college campuses than the
previous five decades combined. Holtz, supra note 59.,
82 See Stephen Moore, No Hann, No Foul, at http//www.intellectualcapital.conl
issuesi98/0507/icopinions2.asp.
a3 United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983). This scandal reached national prominence
when Sports Illustrated published an article entitled How I Put the Fix In by Henry Hill, in collaboration
with Douglas Looney, in its February 16, 1981 issue. This article purported to be Henry Hill's first-hand
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The Boston College point-shaving scheme was born in Pittsburgh during
the summer months of 1978 and was the brainchild of Rocco Perla and his
brother Anthony.84 The Perla brothers were small-time gamblers with big-
time ideas. The plan they proposed was simple. In concert with Kuhn, who
was a high school friend of Rocco Perla that was entering his senior year at
B.C., they would select certain basketball games where the projected point
spread separating B.C. from its opponent was expected to be significant.'s
Kuhn would be responsible for ensuring, by his play on the court, that B.C.
fell short of the proposed point spread. Thus, for example, if participating
bookmakers determined B.C. to be an eight-point favorite in a particular
game, Kuhn would be paid his bonus, usually $2,500, if B.C. won by less
than eight points.'
Rocco and his brother Tony then mobilized a betting syndicate to
maximize the potential gain from this illegal action. They contacted a local
friend, Paul Mazzei, who was known to have influence within major New
York gambling circles. 7 Mazzei, in turn, contacted Henry Hill, a reported
underworld figure from New York who had befriended Mazzei while both
men were serving sentences in a federal penitentiary.'M Mazzei and the Perlas
were particularly hopeful that Hill would enlist the support of his reputed
underworld "Boss,"James Burke, to ensure protection for their enterprise in
the event the bookmakers discovered they were being swindled. 9
The criminal conspiracy unraveled when Henry Hill was indicted by
state authorities on drug conspiracy charges and was subsequently implicated
in the Lufthansa robbery at Kennedy Airport.' While being questioned on
these charges, Hill revealed that he had recently participated in a point
shaving scheme involving the Boston College basketball team and various
underworld figures.9 Burke, Mazzei, Kuhn, Rocco Perla and Anthony Perla
were all indicted on the basis of testimony given by Hill.9
After a four-week trial, each defendant was convicted on charges of
RICO conspiracy, 93 conspiracy to commit sports bribery,94 and interstate
account of the point shaving scheme and implicated the appellants in this scandal.
84 Burke, 700 F.2d at 73.
85 Id. at 73-74.
86 Id. at 74.
s7 Id.
8 Id.
09 Id.
90 Id. at 75.
91 Id.
W Id.
93 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d) (1982);see also, id.
18 U.S.C. S 224 (1982); Id.
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travel with intent to commit bribery.95 Defendant Burke was sentenced to
a twenty-year prison term.96 Kuhn, Mazzei and Anthony Perla were
sentenced to ten-year prison terms on the RICO count, and concurrent five-
year terms on the two remaining counts.9
2. NORTHWESTERN UNiVERSITY
At Northwestern University, former running back Dennis Lundy, once
the school's career rushing leader, pleaded guilty to a federal perjury charge
stemming from an investigation into sports betting involving the
Northwestern football team.9" Lundy admitted to fumbling intentionally on
the University of Iowa 1-yard line during the third quarter of a 1994 game
so he could win a $400 bet.9  Lundy later admitted to betting on five
Northwestern games during his career, including one against Ohio State
University in 1994 when he bet $500 that his Wildcats would lose by more
than the point spread."° He also said he knew of teammates who bet against
Northwestern in that same game."
Dennis Lundy did not always bet against his team. During a 1994 game
against Notre Dame, he said he bet Northwestern would cover a 26-point
spread. 2 When the Northwestern reserves scored a late touchdown to cut
Notre Dame's lead to 41-15, the Wildcats needed only a two-point
conversion for Lundy to win his bet. He then tried to run on the field to give
Northwestern a better shot at the conversion, but was called back by his
coaches. The attempt failed and Lundy lost his $200 bet. 3
Lundy was not alone in bringing the scandal of collegiate sports gambling
to Northwestern. In 1998, former Northwestern basketball players Kenneth
Dion Lee and DeweyWilliams were indicted for point-shaving and fixing the
outcome of games against Penn State University, the University of
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982); Id.
Burke, 700 F.2d at 75.
Id. at 75-76. In a second incident, unrelated to the point shaving scandal, thirteen Boston
College football players were suspended from the team for gambling, including two that allegedly bet
against their own team in a home loss to Syracuse in 1996. As a result, head coach Dan Henning was
fired. See Couch, supra note 79.
98 Ron Cook, Don't Bet Against the Fix Being On, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1999, at
Dl.
99 Couch, supra note 79.
1oo Cook, supra note 98.
t01 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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Wisconsin, and the University of Michigan in 1995.'0 4 The so-called
mastermind behind the point-shaving scheme was Kevin Pendergast, a math
teacher at a prestigious private school in southern California and a former
Notre Dame place kicker who had kicked the winning field goal against
Texas A&M in the 1993 Cotton Bowl.'"' Pendergast, who arrived at Notre
Dame to study and play soccer in 1989, was a suburban kid from well-to-do
Simsbury, Connecticut. He was a Parade High School All-America forward
in soccer, a National Merit Scholarship finalist and an aspiring singer with
an incredibly bright future."°
Unfortunately, Pendergast's life took a drastic change when he met a
bookie while visiting a classmate's home in Indiana. Pendergast later recalled
that "gambling became the center of my life.""' He bet on sports and played
blackjack on a riverboat casino."° Before long, Pendergast needed a way to
pay off his own gambling debt, which was close to $20,000.'09
Sometime in February 1995, Pendergast recruited Kenneth Dion Lee, a
senior guard and leading three-point shooter on Northwestern's basketball
team."' Pendergast knew that Lee also had a gambling problem and needed
a way to pay off some of his gambling debts."' Lee then recruited Dewey
Williams, a starter who played both forward and center. 2 To round out the
"scheme team," Pendergast recruited Brian Irving, an acquaintance who lived
in Reno, Nevada (where sports betting is legal), to place the bets. 13
For all of this planning, only one of their point-shaving attempts
succeeded. Their first game, a February 15, 1995 game against the University
ofWisconsin, ended in a "push" when Northwestern's fourteen-point losing
margin equaled the spread." 4 A week later, Lee and the Wildcats lost to Penn
State eighty-nine to fifty-nine, falling far short of the spread." 5 Three days
later, Pendergast met Lee at a restaurant near campus and handed him an
104 See Ante Z. Udovicic, Special Report: Sports and Gambling a Good Mix? I Wouldn't Bet on It, 8
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401,427 (1998).
'0 Linda M. Cowan, Point Shaving -A Team Sport?, 547 PLI/PAT 1213 (1999).
106 Lester Munson, The Fix Was In, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 9, 1998, at 100.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Hruby, supra note 80.
110 Cowan, supra note 105.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Munson, supra note 106.
115 Id.
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envelope containing Lee's share of the winnings -- $4,000, for which Lee
paid Williams approximately $700.116
On March 1, Pendergast and Lee tried again. This time Pendergast
personally traveled to Las Vegas to place a $20,150 wager at Caesar's Palace
that the Northwestern basketball team would lose to the University of
Michigan by at least 25 1 points.1 7 For his part, Pendergast would pay Lee
$8,000.'18 Even though Lee passed up shots and threw the ball away,
Northwestern only lost by seventeen points." 9
On March 26, 1998, all four members of the scheme were indicted by a
federal grand jury. Each member was charged with one count of conspiracy
to commit sports bribery.' 2 In addition, Pendergast was charged with three
counts, and Irving two counts, of using interstate facilities in aid of
racketeering.' 21 On April 9, 1998, Pendergast pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit sports bribery. He also agreed to cooperate with the FBI and will be
working with the NCAA to educate athletes about the risks of gambling.'2
On April 20,1998, Lee pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sports bribery.
He also agreed to cooperate with the FBI and will be lecturing student
athletes on the dangers of gambling."z
3. ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
At Arizona State, point guard Stevin "Hedake" Smith began as a small-
time gambler, mainly wagering on NFL games. 124 He later found himself so
far in debt that he began betting on hockey to get even.22 Before long, his
gambling habit left him hopelessly in debt.
Much like Kenneth Dion Lee at Northwestern, Smith became an easy
target for organized crime figures. Smith turned to teammate Isaac Burton,
the team's best free-throw shooter, for help in his point-shaving scheme. He
told Burton to intentionally miss free throws at the end of the game so the
Sun Devils would not cover the point spread.'26
116 Id.
117 Ryan Ernst, Ohio U.: College Sports Hit Hard by Gambling in the 90's, U-WIRE, Nov. 14, 2000.
118 Munson, supra note 106.
119 Id.
120 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1997); see also Cowan, supra note 105.
1.1 18 U.S.C. S 1952 (1997); see also Cowan, supra note 105
1= Cowan, supra note 105.
123 Id.
124 Cook, supra note 98.
'2 Id.
i' Derek Samson, Ex-Sun Devil Burton Refuses to Talk About Point Shaving, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Dec. 6, 1997, at IC.
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After bookmakers in Nevada discovered that the betting pattern on
Arizona State games changed tremendously, they alerted the FBI. 27 A
federal investigation later found point-shaving in four Arizona State games
during the 1993-94 basketball season. 28 In one instance, a matchup against
PAC-10 rival the University of Washington, Las Vegas casinos suspended
betting on the game after $250,000 in bets caused the line to drop to three
points. 9 In three other instances, the gamblers won each time. The Sun
Devils beat both the University of Oregon and Oregon State University, but
did not cover the spread in either game.' 30 Against the University of
Southern California, the Sun Devils were 7 1 -point favorites, but lost the
game by 12 points. 31 The only game of the four that gamblers lost came in
another game against the University of Washington in which Arizona State
missed its first 14 shots but rallied to win 73-55.132 It was later reported that
the players were informed at halftime that the game was under scrutiny.1
33
In 1997, Smith and Burton admitted to taking money for shaving points
during four games at Arizona State during the 1993-94 season.3 4 Both
pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit sports bribery. 3' In 1999,
Burton was sentenced to two months in jail, an $8,000 fine, three years
probation, and six months of home detention.
36
E. The Emergence of the Internet and its Effect on Collegiate Sports Gambling
Perhaps the most dangerous development in the spread of collegiate
sports gambling is the growth of the Internet. While a full explanation of the
Internet, as well as the jurisdictional and enforcement problems associated
with it, is beyond the scope of this comment, it is worth noting how this
recent phenomenon is changing the face of collegiate sports gambling. At the
present time, it is easier than ever to bet on college sporting events. As a
result of the Internet explosion, wagers can now be placed anonymously
from the privacy of one's own home, or perhaps more troubling, directly
from a dormitory room. Another problem inherent in Internet sports
1.1 Ismail TurayJr., Congress Might Try to Ban Gambling on College Sports, THE FoRT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM,Jan. 24,2000, at 14.
128 Ernst, supra note 117.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Samson, supra note 126.
135 Ernst, supra note 117.
136 Burton Warned on Penalty Lapses, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC,June 17,2000, at C2.
2002] LAS VEGAS LOOPHOLE
gambling is the inability of Internet gambling operators to prevent minors
from logging onto websites and placing wagers.
137
Further, since most federal and state gambling laws were created long
before the emergence of the Internet, the applicability of these laws to
Internet sports gambling has now become an important question.138
However, a careful review of federal gambling laws demonstrates that
Congress had the foresight to draft these prohibitions broadly enough to
encompass the possibility that the means for offering gambling may change
over time.1 39  As a result, contrary to what many gamblers and service
providers believe, gambling on collegiate sporting events over the Internet is
already illegal. The transmission of gambling information in interstate or
foreign commerce is prohibited under both the Wire Act' 4° and the Travel
Act.1
41
Nonetheless, in an effort to avoid the application of the Wire Act and the
Travel Act, many Internet gambling operators have argued that these laws are
137 See Brad Knickerbocker, For Many Teens, Gambling Starts at Home, First It's a Scratch of a Lotto
Ticket, Eventually it Could be Stealing to Support an Addiction, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1999, at 3.
138 Many have argued that the Wire Act is insufficient in the age oflnternet gambling. A bill has
been introduced in the Senate - the Kyl Amendment - that would update the Wire Act so that it
specifically prohibits gambling on the Internet. Known as the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997,
the bill was originally introduced as Senate Bill S. 474 on March 3, 1997 by SenatorJohn Kyl (R-AZ) and
has been through a series of revisions. See S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997). If passed, the amendment would
ensure a uniform approach to criminal liability within the United States, thereby creating predictability
regarding liability and eliminating interstate disputes as to the legality of on-line gambling. See H.R. 3125,
106th Cong. (2000) for the current form of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act.
139 Seegenerallyjocl Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 1021 (Fall 1999).
140 18 U.S.C. S 1084 (2000). The Wire Act provides in part:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or
wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest, or for the transmission ofa wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive
money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Id. at S 1084(a).
141 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). The Travel Act states that:
Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, including the mail, with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful
activity; or (2) commit any crime ofviolence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise
promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment,
or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and therefore performs or attempts to perform (A) an
act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
Id. at S 1952 (a)-(b).
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inapplicable to Internet gambling because such technology did not exist at
the time of the statutes' enactment.142 As a result, Congress could never have
intended these Acts to apply to Internet gambling.
Contrary to this argument, the legislative history behind the passage of
the Wire Act indicates it was intended to be applied broadly, so as to prevent
any interstate, or international, transmission of gambling information, to or
from the United States, using wire communication facilities. 43 In addition
to the legislative history, a broad interpretation of both Acts is also suggested
in case law. Illustrative is the Fifth Circuit's observation in United States v.
Steubben&" that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Wagering Paraphernalia
Act were meant to be interpreted broadly so as to accomplish the
congressional intent behind their passage, namely to regulate "any gambling-
related activity that touches upon interstate commerce."1
45
In a further effort to circumvent the Wire and Travel Acts, Internet
gambling operators have also moved their efforts offshore.'46 Nonetheless,
in a recent New York case, People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,147
application of the Wire and Travel Acts to offshore Internet gambling was
specifically addressed. In deciding whether the State of New York could
enjoin a foreign corporation legally licensed to operate a casino offshore from
offering gambling to Internet users in New York, the Court held that the
Wire Act, Travel Act and Wagering Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the
fact that the betting instructions are transmitted from outside the United
States (in this case Antigua) over the Internet.'8 If anything, World Interactive
"4 See Schwarz, supra note 139, at 1030.
143 See H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.CA.N. 2631.
14 United States v. Steubber, 799 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1986).
145 Id. at 229.
146 See NGISC, supra note 24, at 5-1 (noting that as the U.S. Congress debates legislation to
prohibit Internet gambling, several foreign governments have moved in the other direction and have
licensed Internet gambling operations within their own borders, which Americans can access). The
countries with laws in place to extend Internet gambling licenses include: five territories within Australia,
Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Finland, Germany, Grand Turk, Grenada, Honduras, the territory of Kalmykia in Russia,
Liechtenstein, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, South Africa, Trinidad, Turks and Caicos
Islands, four territories in the United Kingdom, Vanatu, and Venezuela.
147 People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
148 Id. at 851. In describing how the respondents' interstate use of the Internet violated federal
law, the court noted:
Like a prohibited telephone call from a gambling facility, the Internet is accessed by using a
telephone wire. When the telephone wire is connected to a modem attached to a user's
computer, the user's phone line actually connects the user to the Internet server and then the
user may log onto this illegal gambling website from any location in the United States. After
selecting from the multitude of illegal games offered by respondent, the information is
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Gaming suggests that those websites offering collegiate sports gambling over
the Internet are in violation of existing federal and, in many cases, state law.
IV. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In response to the NGISC's recommendation to ban collegiate sports
gambling, various members of the United States 106th Congress have
proposed three separate bills. The Student Athlete Protection Act, 49
introduced by Representatives Lindsey 0. Graham (R-SC) and Tim Roemer
(D-IN), would amend Section 3704 of PASPA to prohibit high school,
college and amateur sports gambling in all states, including Nevada.'-s The
Amateur Sports Integrity Act,"5' introduced by Senators John McCain (R-
AZ), Samuel D. Brownback (R-KS) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), would
eliminate gambling on high school, collegiate and amateur sports, including
the Olympics. Lastly, the High School and College Sports Gambling
Prohibition Act,'5 2 introduced by Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Samuel
D. Brownback (R-KS), would specifically ban betting on collegiate sporting
events in the state of Nevada.
The practical effect of these three bills would be to expand the reach of
PASPA, the 1992 law passed by Congress that prohibited wagering on all
amateur and professional sports except in a handful of states where the
activity was already legal, or the legality of such was being contemplated -
namely Nevada, Delaware, Oregon and Montana. 3 Many believe these
measures would help curb the destructive and unseemly practice of gambling
on the athletic success of our nation's young student-athletes. Further, as the
amount of money legally wagered on college sports escalates, the pressures
on student athletes to provide inside information for gambling purposes or
transmitted to the server in Antigua. Respondents' server then transmits betting information
back to the user, which is in violation ofthe Wire Act. The Internet site creates a virtual casino
within the user's computer terminal. By hosting this casino and exchanging betting
information with the user, an illegal communication in violation of the Wire Act and the
Travel Act has occurred.
Id. at 852.
149 H.R. 3575, 106th Cong. (2000).
150 The bill contains what some believe to be two red herrings. In addition to prohibiting
gambling on collegiate athletic events, the bill would also ban gambling on high school athletic events
(which is not currently legal), as well as gambling on Olympic events (which is conceded by both sides
as representing an incredibly small, if any, problem).
151 S. 2340, 106th Cong. (2000).
152 S. 2021, 106th Cong. (2000).
153 18 U.S.C. § 3704 (2000).
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to shave points and fix games will likely increase. These measures would
thus reduce the vulnerability of our nation's college athletes.
The House bill, along with its companion bills in the Senate, is a direct
response to the June 1999 recommendations by the NGISC. Among the
recommendations put forward by the NGISC was that "betting on collegiate
and amateur athletic events that is currently legal be banned altogether."' 54
In making this recommendation the NGISC stated, "Sports wagering
threatens the integrity of sports, it puts student athletes in a vulnerable
position, it can put adolescent gamblers at risk for gambling problems, and
it can devastate individuals and careers."
55
A. Arguments in Favor of the Proposed Federal Legislation
Proponents of the legislation believe that closing PASPA's loophole will
aid in preserving the integrity of college sporting events, as well as assist in
protecting student-athletes from pressures to influence the results of their
own games. Such believers include prominent senators like Sen. John
McCain (R-AZ), Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-
KS), in addition to the NCAA, and many top college coaches such as the
University of South Carolina football coach Lou Holtz and the University
of Kentucky men's basketball coach Tubby Smith.
Those who support the proposed federal legislation do not believe it will
create a "serious threat" to the Nevada economy - as many opposed to the
legislation have contended. In 1999, approximately $2.3 billion was wagered
in Nevada sports books. 56 Casinos retained $99 million, a little more than
3.5% of the total amount wagered on sports. 7 Steven DuCharme, chairman
of the Nevada State Gaming Control Board, believes the amount kept by
1.58casinos on sports gambling is "very small" compared to other casino games.
Further, the amount wagered on college sports is only a little more than a
third of the total amount wagered on all sports."9 Additionally, the amount
bet on college sports is only 3/10 of 1% of overall casino revenues.16  In
154 NGISC, supra note 24, at 3-18.
'm Id. at 2-14.
156 Ban on Amateur Sports Bening: Hearings on S. 2021 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. Charles T. Wethington, Jr., President of the
University of Kentucky and Chair of the NCAA Executive Committee) [hereinafter Wethington, Jr.
Hearings].
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 The Student Athlete Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3575 Before the U.S. House of Representatives'
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Graham B. Spanier, President of The
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reality, in an industry driven by billions of dollars (1999 total casino revenues
were $10.1 billion), the elimination of collegiate sports gambling will have
"little impact" on state revenues or on the casinos' bottom line.' 6'
Charles T. Wethington,Jr., President of the University of Kentucky and
Chair of the NCAA Executive Committee, further argues that the existence
of legal sports gambling in Nevada is actually "limiting" the growth of the
Nevada economy in some areas.' 62 For instance, most amateur and
professional sports leagues have policies against franchise location and events
staged in Nevada because of the presence of sports gambling'
63
The pending legislation would also remove any justification for the
publishing of point spreads" on collegiate sporting events in our nation's
newspapers. In addition, a ban on all collegiate sports gambling would help
curtail the widespread advertising of sport's handicapping services in
newspapers, magazines, and on television. Because point spreads contribute
to the popularity of sports wagering, a uniform prohibition on collegiate
sports gamblingwould re-sensitize the public to the corrupting nature of this
activity and encourage newspapers to follow the lead of the New York
Times,'65 which voluntarily refuses to publish the point spreads of college
games.
One reason Americans may not be aware of the illegality of collegiate
sports wagering is that the Las Vegas line, or point spread, is published in
Pennsylvania State University and chair of the Division I Board of Directors of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association).
161 Wethington,Jr. Hearings, supra note 156.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Burke, 700 F.2d at 75 (providing an explanation of the practical operation of point spreads in
professional gambling). The process begins when participating bookmakers agree to establish a line on
an upcoming sporting event. Bookmakers create this line by determining, on the basis of prior records,
injuries, home field advantage and other pertinent factors, which team should be favored to win the
upcoming game. If the teams are fairly even in the competitive sense, the point spread should be low.
For example, it teams A and B are relatively equal, the better team would generally be favored to win by
a small margin, perhaps one to three points. Conversely, if one team is far superior, the point spread
would be much larger. To prevail, the gambler must pick the team that will beat the point spread.
Therefore, if team A is favored by five points, the gambler who bets on that team wins if it beats team B
by more than five points. The bettor who wagers money on team B will win if that team wins the game
or even if it loses by less than five points. Id. at 75.
165 Currently only the Washington Post, the NewYork Times and a handful ofother newspapers
refuse to print college point spreads. See Hruby, supra note 80, where Bill Jahoda, an anti-gambling
activist and former head of the Chicago Mafia's gambling operation, has commented, "Why would a
responsible newspaper print the price of an illegal product? They might as well run the price of crack
cocaine and prostitution." Without legal college sports gambling and a widely available point spread,
Jahoda and others believe that the risk of game fixing would be greatly reduced.
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most of the forty-eight states where sports wagering is illegal."6 Some critics
have argued that the point spread is nothing more than a device that appeals
to those who make or solicit bets. Moreover, critics claim that the point
spread does not contribute to the popularity of sports, only to the popularity
of sports wagering.
Legendary football coach Lou Holtz has commented: "I have witnessed
our football players be idolized, praised and cheered after a win. I have also
witnessed their being ridiculed, demonized and ostracized after a win. The
only difference was in one case we covered the point spread, in the other case
we did not." 67 Holtz further comments that "we have to do everything we
can to remove this temptation and to stop the pressure this betting places on
our young people."' 6s
On the other hand, the American Gaming Association (AGA) notes that
betting lines are generated for sports books by independent odds-making
services.169 The decision whether to publish betting lines is made by
hundreds of independent newspaper editors. Citing USA Today as an
example, the NCAA notes that point spreads published in that newspaper are
independently provided by Danny Sheridan of Mobile, Alabama.17' Further,
the NCAA said it was unsuccessful in a prior effort to stop the publication
of point spreads in newspapers.'17  Several years ago, the NCAA tried to
withhold press credentials from sports reporters for newspapers that publish
point spreads. The NCAA was forced to abandon their effort in the face of
First Amendment and other legal objections. 72 Fahrenkopfbelieves there is
no basis to conclude the NCAA would be any more successful in removing
point spreads just because legal wagering was no longer offered in Nevada.' 73
Moreover, it is argued that newspapers would continue to publish college
point spreads even if collegiate sports gambling is eventually prohibited. An
April 2000 Harris poll found that 70% of readers use point spreads to obtain
more information about games, while only 11% use spreads to place bets
with bookmakers.7 4 In a June letter to the House Judiciary Committee,
Newspaper Association of America president John Sturm cited those figures
16 NGISC, supra note 24, at 2-14.
167 Holtz, supra note 59.
168 Id.
16 Proposed Legislation Banning College Sports Wagering: Hearing on H.R. 3575 Before the U.S. House
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when stating: "Point spreads appear to be useful, if not valuable, to
newspaper readers who have no intention of betting on games." 7' Lastly,
since the gambling industry points to the Internet as the future source of
point spreads, Congress' passage of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act'76
may have a significant impact on U.S. access to online sports gambling sites.
B. Arguments Against the Proposed Federal Legislation
Opponents of the proposed federal legislation include Nevada legislators
and gaming lobbyists. They say the bills represents "nothing more than feel-
good legislation that will do little to address the issue of gambling in college
sports." 77 Proponents of Nevada sports books argue that regulated sports
books pose little threat to the integrity of sports contests and that illegal
sports gambling is the real culprit. 78
Unfortunately, what opponents of the proposed federal legislation fail to
mention is that Nevada gaming regulations clearly recognize the potential
danger that legal sports gambling presents. Before these three bills were
proposed, Nevada gaming regulations prohibited Nevada sports books from
accepting bets on college athletics events that occur in state, as well as games
of Nevada's universities'79 played outside the state's borders."8 Inexplicably,
this protection did not extend to any of the colleges or universities located in
the other forty-nine states. However, after enormous criticism, questioning
the unique protections afforded to Nevada's collegiate teams, the Nevada
Gaming Commission repealed its home-town protection. 8'
FrankJ. Fahrenkopf, Jr., President and CEO of the American Gaming
Association, agrees with the university presidents that there is a serious
problem on college campuses with illegal gambling. 2 Nonetheless,
Fahrenkopf believes that the proposal to do away with Nevada sports books
175 Id.
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"does not have a nexus with the problem." 83 Therefore, the AGA has
pledged to fight the bills, which it termed "an ineffective Band-Aid on a
campus cancer. " 184 Farenkopf also argues that "H.R. 3575 is built on the
faulty premise that ending the small amount of legal wagering in Nevada that
Congress approved in 1992 will reduce illegal gambling outside Nevada." 18
Moreover, opponents of the proposed federal legislation argue that
PASPA's preservation of previously enacted state statutes is consistent with
the fact that since the founding of our country, states, not the federal
government, have determined what gambling, if any, should be permitted in
each state.16  The principle of federalism underlying this division of
authority is enshrined in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 7
However, even strong advocates of state's rights should recognize that this
argument goes too far. The notion of state's rights reflects the view that each
state should have the authority to determine how best to govern within that
state's own boundaries - not the authority to set laws that allow a state to
impose its policies on every other state while exempting itself
Nevada lawmakers and other gambling supporters have also geared up
to fight the bills. Rep. Shelley Berkley (D-NV) called it "a red herring, an
exercise in finger-pointing" that blames Nevada for the nationwide problem
of illegal sports gambling.88 Likewise, Sen. Richard Bryan (D-NV) said, "It
will do absolutely nothing to address the very real problem of illegal sports
betting. The only practical effect this legislation will have is to push sports
betting into the back alleys of America." 8 9
Those against the proposed federal legislation also argue that the passage
of almost a decade strengthens the case for not re-opening (much less
arbitrarily overturning) PASPA's grandfather clause."9 In reliance on that
provision, Nevada's casino-hotel industry has invested tens of millions of
dollars in state-of-the-art race and sports book facilities."9 ' To change the law
now, as H.R. 3575 proposes, would break the bargain that was essential to
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PASPA's enactment."9 More importantly, allowing Congress to break the
bargain among the states that was reached in 1992, thereby federally
preempting Nevada's state gaming decisions after the fact, would set an
extremely dangerous precedent. What would prevent Congress from
preempting other state gaming decisions? This serious question transcends
H.R. 3575 and its companions and affects each of the other forty-nine states,
forty-six of which have some form of legal wagering (all but Hawaii, Utah
and Tennessee).' 93
Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn recently expressed his strong concern
about the negative economic effects that H.R. 3575 would needlessly inflict
on Nevada's economy and its citizens. For example, during Super Bowl
weekend, when an estimated 250,000 people visit Las Vegas, the hotel
occupancy rate is essentially 100%."9 In addition, the jobs generated by
sports gambling are not only those in the race and sports books, but extend
throughout each of the hotel-casino-resort complexes to maids, valet parking
attendants, food and beverage servers, and casino floor personnel.' 9' These
jobs, along with federal, state, and local tax levies, help generate billions of
dollars in government revenues.
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Lastly, opponents of the proposed federal legislation argue that there are
many laws currently on the books that prohibit sports gambling and the
proper solution lies in enforcing the existing laws and making certain that
penalties are adequate to deter violations. In other words, if merely enacting
prohibitory laws was enough to deter sports gambling, the problem would
not be as severe as all concede it is today.
V. CONCLUSION
Gambling on collegiate sporting events is not a recent phenomenon. In
fact, its presence has been known for well over fifty years. Nonetheless, the
last decade saw more college sports gambling-related scandals on college
campuses than the previous five decades combined. With the rapid increase
in technology, as well as the emergence of the Internet, the number of
college sports gambling-related scandals is only going to increase.
While a total ban on collegiate sporting events is not a panacea, it is a
significant start. Our nation's college and university system has become a
worldwide model for postsecondary education. Moreover, college sports
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provide a forum where student athletes can achieve excellence by displaying
the values that our educational system has instilled in them: team work, self-
sacrifice, perseverance, courage, and sportsmanship. In addition to
diminishing the esteem in which the rest of the world views our nation's
universities, the practice of collegiate sports gambling tarnishes the integrity
of sports and places unseemly influences on our amateur athletes. Being one
of the many proud fans that have come to know and love college sports, we
all deserve to know these athletic contests are both honest and fair.
